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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes International Space Station (ISS) micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) 
impact shielding including requirements for protection as well as technical approaches to meeting 
requirements.  Current activities in providing MMOD protection for ISS are described, including 
efforts to augment MMOD protection by adding shields on-orbit. Another activity is to observe 
MMOD impact damage on ISS elements and returned hardware, and to compare the observed 
damage with predicted damage using Bumper code risk assessment software.  A conclusion of 
this paper is that ISS will be protected adequately from MMOD impact after completing 
augmentation of ISS shielding for Service Module, and after improving MMOD protection for 
Soyuz and Progress vehicles.  Another conclusion is that impact damage observed to the ISS 
mini-pressurized logistics module matches the distribution of impacts predicted by Bumper code.  
 
Introduction 
 
Providing adequate micro-meteoroid orbital 
debris (MMOD) protection for the 
International Space Station (ISS) is essential 
to ensure crew safety, vehicle survivability 
and functionality.  A number of papers and 
NASA reports provide a detailed description 
of the ISS MMOD protection strategy, 
requirements for protection and means to 
meet requirements1-6.  ISS consists of a 
number of individual elements provided by 
NASA and international partners in Europe, 
Russia, Japan, and Canada.  Top-level ISS 
MMOD requirements are allocated to 
individual elements.  The element providers 
are responsible for meeting allocated MMOD 
protection requirements, while NASA is 
responsible for determining compliance to the 
top-level requirement.   
 
This paper summarizes current status of ISS 
MMOD protection. The methodology used in 
assessing MMOD risk and typical shielding 
techniques implemented to meet 
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requirements are described. On-orbit 
augmentation of Service Module MMOD 
shielding is underway.  Methods to improve 
MMOD protection for Soyuz and Progress 
have been evaluated and will substantially 
reduce MMOD risks for these vehicles.  
These changes/modifications are necessary 
to meet ISS MMOD protection requirements.  
 
ISS MMOD Requirements 
 
MMOD protection exists to ensure crew 
safety and mission success.  MMOD 
requirements for ISS have the following 
objectives: 
 
• Protect the crew from meteoroid/debris 
impact. 
 
• Protect ISS critical hardware from 
meteoroid/debris impact. 
 
• Minimize damage to all station elements 
from meteoroid/debris. 
 
Specific requirements for ISS MMOD 
protection include: 
 
(1) Comply with overall ISS shielding 
penetration probability requirement of less 
than 24% over 10 years; i.e., 
meet/exceed 0.76 Probability of No 
Penetration (PNP). 
 
(2) Comply with ISS catastrophic penetration 
probability requirement of less than 5%; 
i.e., meet/exceed 0.95 Probability of No 
Catastrophic Failure (PNCF). 
 
By definition, a hole or through-crack in the 
pressure shell of an ISS module is a 
“penetration” of MMOD shielding covered by 
the first requirement; i.e., there should be less 
than a 24% chance that a shield penetration 
or depressurization event occurs from MMOD 
impact to ISS over 10years. A PNP 
requirement is allocated to each ISS module 
and external “MMOD critical” element (such 
as pressure vessels or control moment gyros) 
based on the surface area (in m2) and 
exposed duration (years) of the 
module/element using the following formula: 
 
PNP = 0.99999Surface Area * Duration 
 
PNP is assessed using the Bumper code.  
Pressure shell leaks of any size from MMOD 
impact would be a serious operational issue.  
ISS crews are trained to locate, isolate and 
patch leaks in the pressure shell7.  However, 
certain types of penetrations are potentially 
catastrophic, i.e., a penetration could be of 
the size or in a location that results in death 
of one or more crew members.  Determining 
risk of catastrophic impact from MMOD 
involves calculation of the “R” factor for each 
ISS module and external critical element, 
which is the ratio of catastrophic loss to shield 
penetrating impacts.  PNCF for each module 
and external shielded element is determined 
from PNP and R as follows: 
 
PNCF = PNPR 
 
R-factor includes assessment of crew loss 
due to a number of scenarios including 
catastrophic rupture of the crew module 
pressure shell, hypoxia of crew from fast 
depressurization, loss of crew from internal 
fragments and other effects of a MMOD 
penetration, as well other factors1,8.   
 
MMOD Shielding Development 
 
Development of MMOD shielding for ISS is 
based on risk assessments using Bumper 
code supported by hypervelocity impact tests 
and numerical simulations as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1: MMOD risk assessment process showing 
that failure criteria is defined for each part of 
the vehicle, hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests 
and analysis are performed to develop 
ballistic limit equations (BLE), the BLEs and 
MMOD environment models are used in 
Bumper code to assess MMOD risk.  
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An objective of the assessments is to identify 
risk drivers (i.e., areas of the vehicle that 
contribute a majority of the overall MMOD 
risk), and determine relative effectiveness of 
changes in vehicle design, shielding or 
operations to reduce MMOD risk.  Bumper 
code results provide the basis for showing 
compliance of the hardware to MMOD 
protection requirements.  Additional details of 
the Bumper code can be found elsewhere1,9. 
 
After vehicle shielding has been developed 
and verified, the risk assessment process is 
not over.  Actual MMOD damage to the 
vehicle is identified during mission 
operations, to assess how well actual 
damage compares to Bumper predictions, to 
trend damage, evaluate design margins, and 
most importantly to determine if changes 
should be considered to vehicle design and 
operations to decrease MMOD damage and 
vehicle survivability.  As an example, based 
on actual MMOD damage identified in post-
flight inspections, changes were made to 
vehicle design and operations (i.e., via 
selection of low-risk flight attitudes and on-
orbit inspections) to reduce MMOD risks to 
Shuttle radiator and wing leading-edge 
systems10.     
 
Overall Status  
 
Results of MMOD risk assessments indicate 
ISS MMOD risks are driven by Service 
Module (SM), Soyuz and Progress as 
illustrated by Figure 2 showing penetration 
risk breakdown for each element on ISS 
assuming 2-Progress operations.  The reason 
for this result is simply that low-weight and 
relatively low-performance shields protect 
areas of these elements.  As shown in Table 
1, the average shield mass per unit area for 
elements of ISS that are risk drivers (SM, 
Soyuz, Progress) are a factor of 5 lower than 
the MMOD shielding mass for the rest of ISS.  
The lightly shielded elements on ISS 
constitute only 15% of the total exposed area, 
but contribute a disproportionate amount of 
MMOD risk to ISS.  The most effective way to 
reduce MMOD risk to the elements that are 
risk drivers is to add supplemental MMOD 
shielding in locations where risks are highest.  
The effort to improve MMOD shielding on 
these elements is underway.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: MMOD penetration risk breakdown for ISS 
in current configuration (basis: 1 year, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Current ISS configuration showing 2 
Progress vehicles and 1 Soyuz docked to ISS 
(excluding solar arrays, radiators and truss).   
 
 
ISS Elements MMOD Risk & Shielding Metrics 
Combined for 12 of 16 
current elements (FGB, 
Node 1, PMA 1, PMA 2, 
PMA 3, CMG, PCU, US 
Lab, Airlock & HPGC, 
TCS-S, TCS-P, MPLM) 
and 10 future elements 
(Node 2, Columbus, 
ATV, JEM PM, JEM 
ELM-PS, HTV,  Node 3, 
MLM/FGB-2, Research 
Module, Cupola) 
1. 85% of total ISS by area 
2. Penetration Risk 14% of 
total 
3. Catastrophic Risk 49% of 
total 
4. Shielding mass 22,700kg  
5. Shielding mass/area 
10kg/m2  
6. “Average” shielding 
capability=1cm 
Combined for 4 
elements:  
Service Module, Soyuz, 
Progress & Docking 
Compartment 
1. 15% of total ISS by area 
2. Penetration Risk 86% of 
total 
3. Catastrophic Risk 51% of 
total 
4. Shielding mass 700kg  
5. Shielding mass/area 
<2kg/m2  
6. “Average” shielding 
capability=0.3cm 
Table 1: MMOD risk and shielding mass/area for 
current and future ISS elements. 
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ISS MMOD Shields 
 
Many hundreds of MMOD shields protect ISS 
elements, differing by location and in 
materials of construction, mass, thickness 
and volume.  Figure 4 illustrates typical 
MMOD shield types used on ISS, which 
include Whipple and “Stuffed” Whipple (SW) 
shields.  Whipple shields consist of an outer 
bumper (typically aluminum), multi-layer 
insulation (MLI) thermal blanket, and an inner 
rearwall or pressure shell (also aluminum 
typically).  The SW shield includes an 
intermediate bumper (typically non-metallic) 
between outer bumper and pressure shell.  
The SW shields are more capable at 
providing MMOD protection than Whipple 
shields, and are used in areas of ISS where 
higher concentrations of MMOD impacts are 
expected to occur, generally forward and 
port/starboard areas of ISS elements. For 
instance, approximately half of the cylinder 
section of the US Laboratory module is 
protected by the SW shield shown in Figure 5 
(port and starboard quadrants).  MMOD 
shield performance is improved with greater 
standoff distance from outer bumper to 
rearwall or pressure wall, and typically ISS 
shields have the maximum standoff possible 
that fits within the launch vehicle 
shroud/payload bay envelope and to meet 
other volume requirements and constraints.  
Generally, ISS shield standoff distances are 
between 10cm and 30cm. Details of ISS 
MMOD shields are described in other 
reports1,2,9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Typical ISS MMOD Shield Types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: US Laboratory Nextel/Kevlar Stuffed 
Whipple (SW) Shield2.  NextelTM is a ceramic 
fabric from 3M Corporation and KevlarTM is a 
high-strength fabric made by DuPont. 
Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) 
 
Ballistic limit equations for all ISS shields are 
essential for MMOD risk assessments.  BLEs 
define the MMOD particle size that “fails” a 
shield as a function of impact velocity, angle, 
density of MMOD particle and shape.  Failure 
is defined for ISS shields as a complete 
penetration, through-hole or through-crack in 
the rearwall or pressure shell of the shield.  
Detached spall (without a through-hole) in the 
rearwall is also a failure mode, but does not 
commonly occur in impact tests on realistic 
shields containing MLI thermal blankets 
and/or intermediate bumpers.  Ballistic limit 
equations are based on extensive 
hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing, hydrocode 
simulations and analytical models. Ballistic 
limits for typical ISS SW shields protecting 
the US Laboratory, Columbus and Japanese 
Experiment Module (JEM) are given in Figure 
6 based on equations given elsewhere9,11.  
The difference in the ballistic limits is due to 
differences in the intermediate layer 
configuration and in overall standoff distance 
of the shield.  In this particular example, the 
Columbus SW shield has the higher ballistic 
limit and MMOD shielding performance, but 
has a greater shield mass and larger standoff 
than the other two shield types. 
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Fig. 6: Typical ISS Stuffed Whipple (SW) Shield 
ballistic limits for aluminum spherical impactors 
at normal (0o) impact angle9.  ESA Columbus 
overall shield mass/area is 3.1g/cm2 and shield 
standoff is 13cm, US Laboratory module shield 
mass/area is 2.7g/cm2 and shield standoff 
11cm, JEM shield mass/area is 2.2g/cm2 and 
shield standoff is 11cm. 
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Whipple shield ballistic limits are strongly 
influenced by the presence, location and 
mass of MLI thermal blanket, as given in 
Figure 7.  To provide more accurate MMOD 
risk assessments, ballistic limits for ISS 
Whipple shields have been developed based 
on impact tests on targets that include MLI 
thermal blankets.     
 
2.0mm Al6061T6 bumper, MLI, 107mm standoff, 4.8mm Al2219T87 wall
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Fig. 7: Typical ISS Whipple Shield ballistic 
limits9,11.  MLI thermal blanket improves the 
shielding performance.   Bumper thickness 
0.2cm Al, rearwall thickness 0.48cm Al, 10.7cm 
standoff. 
 
Service Module Augmentation Shields 
 
Service Module (SM) MMOD protection will 
be improved by adding augmentation shields 
on-orbit by extravehicular activity (EVA).  SM 
augmentation shields (Figure 8) include 23 
conformal shield panels to be attached in the 
conical region between small and large 
diameter cylinders, 2 deployable shield 
“wings”, and turning the solar arrays in near-
vertical orientation (±22.5 degrees).   
 
Fig. 8: Augmentation of Service Module MMOD 
Shielding 
 
Six of the 23 SM conformal shield panels 
were delivered to ISS on flight UF2 (June 
2002) and installed shortly thereafter by EVA 
(Figure 9).  The remaining 17 conformal 
panels have been manufactured and are 
awaiting launch on flight 12A.1 planned in 
2007.  Conformal panels are approximately 
10cm thick and consist of an outer aluminum 
cover, a corrugated aluminum layer behind 
the cover, a glass-fiber reinforced layer within 
the panel followed by several layers of 
technical cloth (Russian “Kevlar” equivalent). 
The cross-section of a conformal panel on the 
SM conical region is similar to the stuffed 
Whipple shields protecting other ISS 
modules. Hypervelocity impact tests in 
Russia and at NASA indicate the conformal 
panels over SM conical region materials 
provide similar levels of MMOD protection as 
ISS Stuffed Whipple shields (Figure 10).  
 
Conformal panels cannot be used 
everywhere on SM to increase MMOD 
protection, because they would cover body-
mounted radiators on the small and large 
diameter cylinder sections of the Service 
Module.  Shields deployed orthogonal to the 
SM cylinders were selected as the most 
effective solution to augment MMOD 
protection in areas covered by radiators.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: SM conformal panels mounted on sidewall 
carrier for UF2 flight to ISS in June 2002.  SM 
conformal panels attached to ISS in on-orbit 
photo from December 2002. 
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Fig. 10: SM conformal panel ballistic limits 
determined from hypervelocity impact tests and 
analysis.  
 
Two SM deployable wings are manifested on 
Shuttle flight ULF4 (launch planned in 2009-
2010) and will be mounted to port and 
starboard sides of the SM forward node.  
Each forward deployable wing consists of 3 
separate layers of Russian basalt cloth 
protected by a fiberglass cover (25cm from 
front to back layer). Impact tests have 
demonstrated that the deployable multi-shock 
shield will provide protection equivalent to the 
best shields on ISS9,11.  SM vertical solar 
arrays are required along with the deployable 
wings to provide complete augmentation. SM 
solar arrays have lower MMOD shielding 
capability than the deployable shields, but are 
larger and have greater coverage than the 
deployables which helps reduce MMOD risks.   
 
Enhancing Soyuz/Progress MMOD 
Protection 
 
Russia (RSC-Energia) and NASA have 
assessed means to improve MMOD 
protection for the Soyuz/Progress Orbital 
Module.  Options included (1) adding 
Nextel/Kevlar to the existing thermal blanket 
or (2) increasing the standoff from the Orbital 
Module pressure shell to the thermal blanket 
by installing standoffs and adding an 
aluminum bumper to attach the thermal 
blanket.  Both options increase the ballistic 
protection of the orbital module (Figure 11) 
and substantially decrease MMOD risk (by 
factor of 4x to 5x), but adds mass to the 
vehicle (20kg-25kg per vehicle).   
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Fig. 11: Change in ballistic limits with 
improvements in MMOD protection of Soyuz 
and Progress Orbital Module9,11. 
 
MMOD shield augmentation/enhancement 
effect on ISS MMOD Risks 
 
Completing augmentation of Service Module 
shields and enhancing MMOD protection of 
the Soyuz and Progress decreases the 
contribution from risk drivers to overall ISS 
risks as shown in Figure 12.  Based on 
current projections, SM augmentation and 
improvement of Soyuz/Progress MMOD 
protection is necessary to meet overall ISS 
MMOD requirements (Table 2).  Note MMOD 
risks projections are subject to change based 
on many variables related to assembly 
sequence, visiting vehicle mix, shielding 
capabilities and MMOD environment models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12: Change in MMOD penetration risks with 
augmentation of Service Module protection and 
improvements in Soyuz and Progress Orbital 
Module. 
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ISS MMOD risks for 10-year time period 
(2007-2016) 
 Penetration Risk 
Catastrophic 
Risk 
ISS with no SM 
augmentation & no 
Soyuz/Progress 
enhancements 
55% 9% 
ISS with SM 
augmentation 49% 8% 
ISS with SM 
augmentation and 
Soyuz/Progress 
enhancement 
29% 5% 
Requirements ≤ 24% ≤ 5% 
Table 2: Change in ISS MMOD risk with 
augmentation of Service Module protection and 
improvements in Soyuz and Progress Orbital 
Module (assumes 2-Progress operations)2. 
Assessed risks are subject to change 
depending on visiting vehicle mix, assembly 
sequence, environment model changes, and 
other factors. 
 
On-Orbit MMOD Damage 
 
Monitoring and trending actual MMOD 
impacts to the ISS and Shuttle vehicles is 
part of the MMOD risk management process 
for these vehicles.  On ISS, multiple MMOD 
impacts have been observed to the mini-
pressurization logistics module (MPLM)12,13, 
ISS windows, ISS radiators, Service Module 
(SM) impact sensors, and other elements.  
One of the most significant damages 
observed to-date on ISS was an impact on 
the outer pane of SM window #13, which was 
large enough to reduce the strength of the 
outer pane to below requirements and 
resulted in the window being “safed” by 
placing an opaque cover over the window on 
the inside, thus effectively eliminating use of 
this window except for emergencies.  
Observed MMOD damage to the MPLM has 
been compared to predictions by Bumper 
code. Observed damage occurs in areas with 
high predicted impact risk (Figure 14). MMOD 
perforations in the outer bumper of the 
Whipple shield protecting MPLM are 
summarized in Table 3, showing that Bumper 
predictions are in reasonably good 
agreement with observations of actual 
damage. 
            
 
Fig. 13: MMOD impact observed to Service 
Module window #7; damage measures 3mm to 
5mm across. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Damages found on various MPLM flights, 
and distribution of actual MMOD damages found 
on the MPLM after STS-102 (ISS flight 5A.1) and 
Bumper code predictions. 
Perforation of MPLM aluminum bumper occurring 
on Flight 5A.1. Hole inside diameter is 1.4mm, 
outside diameter is 2.5mm 
Crater in MPLM grapple fixture occurring 
during Flight UF1. Crater inside diameter 
is 1.1mm, spall diameter is 3.5mm
MPLM bumper perforation risk plot, with impact locations noted
Perforation
Craters
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 Per flight risk 
Frequency of 
bumper 
perforations 
Predicted 55% 1 every 2 flights 
Actual 
Experience 40% 1 every 2.5 flights 
Table 3: Comparison of MPLM actual damage 
and Bumper code predictions for perforations 
in the outer bumper of the MPLM shield.  Data 
from first five flights of the MPLM. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
ISS is protected with the most capable 
MMOD shields ever flown which cover most 
of the modules and external critical elements 
of ISS.  However, the majority of MMOD risk 
to ISS is represented by a few areas of the 
vehicle that are not as well protected, namely 
Service Module, Soyuz and Progress.  
Augmentation of Service Module MMOD 
protection is currently underway with 
shielding that is equal in capability with the 
best shields on ISS.   Improving Soyuz and 
Progress MMOD protection has been shown 
to be technically feasible by RSC-Energia 
testing and evaluation.  Completing the 
augmentation of Service Module shielding, as 
well as improving Soyuz and Progress 
shielding, is required to meet overall ISS 
MMOD protection requirements and will 
improve ISS crew safety and mission 
success. 
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